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Abstract
In this note we discuss the issues involved in attempting to model pandemic dynamics. More specifically, we show how it
may be possible to make projections for the ongoing H1N1 pandemic as extrapolated from knowledge of seasonal
influenza. We derive first-approximation parameter estimates for the SIR model to describe seasonal influenza, and then
explore the implications of the existing classical epidemiological theory for the case of a pandemic virus. In particular, we
note the dramatic nonlinear increase in attack rate as a function of the percentage of susceptibles initially present in the
population. This has severe consequences for the pandemic, given the general lack of immunity in the global population.
Citation: Katriel G, Stone L (2010) Pandemic Dynamics and the Breakdown of Herd Immunity. PLoS ONE 5(3): e9565. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009565
Editor: James Arthur Robert Marshall, University of Bristol, United Kingdom
Received November 11, 2009; Accepted January 21, 2010; Published March 15, 2010
Copyright:  2010 Katriel, Stone. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: The authors acknowledge the support of EU-FP7 grant Epiwork, the Israel Science Foundation, and the Israel Ministry of Health. The funders had no
role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: haggaika@yahoo.com
Introduction
The renewed interest in modelling the dynamics and forecasting
the evolution of emerging and reemerging diseases has been
spurred on further with the arrival of the recent new H1N1
influenza pandemic [1,2]. Unfortunately, conventional modelling
techniques are usually, at best, only able to provide a general idea
of how a pandemic might evolve, since crucial information
concerning model parameters is generally unavailable. For
example,the initial fraction of susceptibles in the population
(S0), and the basic reproductive number (R0) are rarely known,
and are often difficult to estimate. Yet without accurate
information on both of these, it is impossible to predict the
proportion of the population infected, or attack rate, of the the
epidemic.
To make the problem more transparent, during the start of the
recent H1N1 pandemic, there were several large-scale research
efforts into estimating the reproductive number R0 of the new
influenza strain in a fully susceptible population. However, from
the initial growth rate of the epidemic one can only estimate the
effective reproduction number Re~S0R0 and not the two
parameters S0 and R0 separately. The equality R0~Re holds
only if S0~1 (the entire population is susceptible), which may not
be the case for past pandemics and the new influenza strain H1N1
[3]. The importance of distinguishing between the basic
reproductive number R0 and the effective reproductive number
Re is far from a merely terminological matter. For example,
consider two epidemics, one with R0~3, S0~0:5 and the other
with R0~1:5,S0~1. In both cases Re~1:5, and the two
epidemics will initially grow at the same exponential rate, but
the final attack rate of the epidemic with R0~1:5, S0~1 will be
twice that of the epidemic with R0~3, S0~0:5. Thus measuring
growth rate at the beginning of an epidemic cannot provide one
with a prediction for the future, unless one has an independent
estimate of the fraction of susceptibles S0 [4,5].
In this paper we discuss an approach to partially address these
problems, to estimate key variables and to make projections. Our
methodology is general, but we focus on the specific case study of
influenza, because of the exigency of the current pandemic and
because information about seasonal flu is available. Already there
have been a number of studies attempting to model the H1N1
pandemic (e.g. [6–10]). Intriguingly, despite the fact that our
knowledge of seasonal influenza is at a relatively advanced level,
few if any attempts have made use of this information to derive
forecasts for the H1N1 pandemic by simple extrapolation. Even
basic back-of-the-envelope calculations are lacking. We follow this
path by first using the known characteristics of seasonal influenza
epidemics to estimate the basic parameters R0 and S0 which fully
determine the epidemic dynamics in the context of the well known
SIR model. This includes taking into account the duration of the
outbreak, an important factor that is often neglected.
The standard approach for fitting epidemic models is to use
detailed data from epidemic curves as obtained through
surveillance. However, we believe that the type of rough fitting
proposed here is useful as a complement, with the advantage that
it depends only on robust characteristics of influenza epidemics
and is thus less sensitive to the uncertainties involved in the
surveillance process. Furthermore, we think it is useful for
epidemiologists to be able to make simple calculations such as
those demonstrated here, which can serve as a check on results
obtained by more computationally intensive fitting methods (e.g.
MCMC methods), and also help develop the modeler’s ‘‘feel’’ for
the processes and quantities involved.
Having estimated the key parameters R0, S0 for seasonal
influenza, we then proceed to make projections for the expected
attack rate of pandemic influenza, under the assumption that
pandemic influenza differs from seasonal influenza mainly in terms
of the larger initial percentage of susceptibles in the population
(although, as we argue, in contrast to many other investigators,
taking the percentage of susceptibles to be %100 is questionable).
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susceptibles on the size of the epidemic, which we again approach
by using results derived from the SIR model.
Methods
To begin we recall that the SIR model assumes that the
dynamics of Susceptible (S) and Infected (I) and recovered (R)
fractions of the population are governed by the following
equations [11]:
S’~{bIS ð1Þ
I’~bIS{cI ð2Þ
R’~cI: ð3Þ
The contact rate between individuals is set at a constant b, while
the recovery rate is defined by the parameter c.
In order to make predictions we need to fit the above model to
epidemic incidence data for seasonal influenza. Three character-
istic properties specific to seasonal influenza are drawn upon:
(a) The attack rate, A, or fraction of a region’s population
infected over the entire influenza season, lies somewhere
between 5{15% [12]. For convenience, the attack rate is
approximated as 10%,o rA~0:1.
(b) The duration of seasonal influenza epidemics is approxi-
mately 3 months [13].
(c) The average infectious period of a sick individual is 3 days
[14]. Since, by (2), the average length of time that an
individual spends in the I compartment is c{1 days, this
implies that c~1
3
days{1.
We now show that these three properties are sufficient to fit the
SIR model.
Since c is determined by (c), fitting the SIR model requires
determining b and the initial condition S0. It is assumed that the
initial number of infectives is nearly negligible.
A key epidemiological parameter is the basic reproduction
number [15]
R0~
b
c
,
which denotes the number of individuals infected by a single
infected individual placed in a totally susceptible population.
(Of course estimating R0 immediately gives us an estimate of b).
At least as important is the effective reproduction number (see eg.,
[3,16])
Re~S0R0~S0
b
c
, ð4Þ
which denotes the number of individuals infected by a single
individual placed in a population with fraction S0 of susceptibles.
To proceed further it is necessary to take into account the
epidemic’s duration.
For our purposes the duration of an epidemic is defined as the
length D~t2{t1 of the time period ½t1,t2  such that 90% of
infections occur during this period, along with the condition
I(t1)~I(t2). For the SIR model this duration can be expressed in
an integral formula (see Supporting Text S1) which depends only
on c and on Re. This integral may be computed for various values
of Re and c, and typical results are displayed in table 1. This
enables us, assuming that c and the duration of an epidemic is
known, to determine the value of Re for which the duration of the
epidemic fits the one predicted by the SIR model.
Once Re is chosen appropriately it is possible to determine the
population’s initial susceptibility S0 as follows. First, we need Z,
the fraction of susceptibles who are infected during the epidemic,
which can be found as the solution of the final-size equation
[11,17] (see also Supporting Text S1):
1{Z~e{ReZ: ð5Þ
Since the attack rate is known ((a) above) and is given by
A~S0Z, we estimate the fraction of susceptibles in the population
as S0~A=Z.
Results
Fitting parameters for seasonal influenza
Since, by (b), seasonal flu lasts approximately 3 months, table 1
shows that, assuming c{1~3 days, it becomes necessary to take
Re~1:2 to fit the duration of the epidemic.
Substituting Re~1:2 in (5) and solving numerically, we obtain
Z~0:31, that is 31% of the susceptibles become infected.
Therefore the attack rate is A~0:31S0. Based on the assumption
that the attack rate for seasonal flu is A~10%, we conclude that
S0~
0:1
0:31
~0:32. That is, at the beginning of the season some one
third of the population is susceptible and has the potential to be
infected. This level of susceptibility seems reasonable given that a
large component of the population has most likely gained
immunity from previous exposure to related strains of the current
influenza virus. Finally, since Re~1:2 and S0~0:32, we obtain
R0~
Re
S0
~
1:2
0:32
~3:75:
Predicting attack rate for pandemic influenza
Having estimated parameters for seasonal influenza, consider
now the arrival of pandemic influenza into a region. In the absence
of previous exposure to the pandemic, it is reasonable to assume
that a much larger proportion of the population is susceptible than
is the case for the seasonal flu. Our working hypothesis is that there
Table 1. Duration of an epidemic (in days) as a function of
c{1 (average infection period) and Re.
ª{1~2 ª{1~3 ª{1~4 ª{1~5
Re~1:05 239.5 359.1 479.0 599.0
Re~1:1 121.7 182.4 243.3 304.2
Re~1:15 82.4 123.6 164.8 206.0
Re~1:2 62.7 94.1 125.5 156.9
Re~1:25 50.9 76.4 101.9 127.3
Re~1:3 43.1 64.7 86.2 107.7
Re~1:4 33.2 49.9 66.5 83.1
Re~1:5 27.3 41.0 54.7 68.4
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009565.t001
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types of influenza. As far as the average duration of infectivity (or,
equivalently, the mean serial interval), c{1, there is some direct
evidence based on infection networks that it is indeed close to that
of seasonal influenza [18,19]. We shall henceforth assume (in
the absence of hard data) that the intrinsic transmissibility b is
also the same. Therefore we are assuming, in particular that
R0(pandemic)~R0(seasonal)~3:75. It should be noted that this
assumption disregards the effect of seasonality on the reproduction
number: our estimate R0(seasonal)~3:75 is appropriate for the
winter season, in which seasonal flu occurs. Therefore our working
assumption that R0(pandemic)~3:75 is most appropriate when
the pandemic virus is introduced into the population at a date close
to the usual initiation period of the seasonal influenza epidemic.
This was the case for the current H1N1 pandemic in the southern
hemisphere, and less so for the northern hemisphere, where the
virus was introduced ‘out of season’. However, since quantitative
knowledge about the extent of the effect of seasonality on the
transmission rate is meager, we do not take this factor into account
in the following estimates.
When modeling pandemic influenza and estimating R0 it is
often taken for granted that the entire population is susceptible.
This assumption, however, has been shown to be questionable
(Mathews et. al. 2007, McCaw et. al. 2009). Indeed Mathews et
al. (personal communication), based on model-fitting, have
estimated that in the 1918 pandemic in the UK only 52% (95%
confidence interval 41{66%) of the population were suscep-
tible. Moreover, we argue that by considering the expected
duration of an epidemic, calculations based on the SIR model
indicate that 100% population susceptibility is unlikely: it would
imply Re~R0~3:75, which would lead to an epidemic with an
extremely short duration of 12 days. Examining epidemic
curves from past pandemics indicates that their duration is
indeed shorter than those of seasonal influenza epidemics, but
not to such an extent, and usually of the order of one month.
(Note, however, that small isolated communities such as
documented in Alaska in 1918 exhibited 90{100% attack
rates [1], and thus provide examples where S0 may be as large
as 1). Lastly, let us note that the various current estimates of the
effective reproductive number [2,7,10,20,21] for the 2009
H1N1 influenza give results in the range 1:4{3:1.I ti s
important to note that as most of these estimates are based
on the initial growth rate of the epidemic, these are actually
estimatesof Re and not of R0 [3]. Under our assumption
R0(pandemic)~R0(seasonal)~3:75, it follows that S0 must be
significantly less than 1 in order for Re to be in the range of
these previous estimates.
In the following we begin by assuming there is 64%
susceptibility for pandemic influenza (that is, since the number
of infected at the beginning of the epidemic is very small, we
assume 36% of the population is initially immune), which is twice
that we estimated for seasonal influenza. How then does this
simple difference in population susceptibility change the influenza
attack rate? A naive approach might suggest that if there are twice
as many more susceptibles in the population, the attack rate for the
pandemic might be expected to be 20% of the population instead
of 10% for seasonal influenza.
The appropriate calculation of the attack rate (as based on the
SIR model) involves two stages:
(a) Determining the fraction Z of susceptibles who become
infected during an epidemic as the solution of the final-size
equation (5).
(b) Calculating the attack rate as given by A~S0Z.
Since we assume that S0 is twice as high for the pande-
mic influenza as for the seasonal flu, we obtain that
Re(pandemic)~2Re(seasonal)~2|1:2~2:4. From (i) & (ii)
above, a larger value of S0 increases the size of the epidemic in
two ways. Firstly, the quantity Z, the fraction of susceptibles who
become infected, is much larger. Solving (5) for Re~2:4 we obtain
Z~0:88 (that is - 88% of susceptibles will be infected during
the pandemic), in contrast to Z~0:31 for seasonal flu. Secondly,
there are more susceptibles so that the attack rate A~
S0Z~0:88|0:64~0:58. Thus although the estimated number
of susceptibles for the pandemic is twice that for the seasonal flu,
the resulting attack rate is 5:8 times higher (and 2:9 higher than the
‘‘naive’’ prediction).
Discussion
It is interesting to note that the naive prediction is based on the
supposition that doubling the number of susceptibles should
double the number of people infected. However the flaw in this
logic derives from the collective phenomenon whereby for low
levels of susceptibles the population inherits a protection akin to
herd immunity [15]. That is, large numbers of immune individuals
tend to block infection routes and thereby reduce the risks of
infection for the entire population. Thus increasing the number of
susceptibles leads to a breakdown in herd immunity and effectively
amplifies the risks of the epidemic to levels well beyond the naive
prediction. This is demonstrated in Figure 1 which displays a
graph of the true attack rate as a function of S0 and provides a
comparison with the naive prediction.
It should be stressed that the above estimates are subject to the
uncertainty in the estimate of the attack rate of seasonal influenza
Figure 1. Attack rate as a function of the initial fraction of
susceptibles. Assuming R0~3:75, the attack rate (continuous line) is
plotted as a function of the initial fraction of susceptibles S0 in the
population. An epidemic will not trigger unless the initial susceptibles
are greater than S0~0:27, due to herd immunity. The dashed line
shows the naive prediction for the attack rate, obtained by
extrapolating linearly from the 10% attack rate for S0~0:32, which
can be well below the theoretical estimate.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009565.g001
(i)
(ii)
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the population susceptible to the pandemic influenza (which we
took to be S0~0:64). Nevertheless, the goal here is not to give
exact predictions but to convey the conceptual mechanisms
involved, and sometimes the nonintuitive outcomes when a
pandemic triggers. Most significantly, the epidemic attack rate
can reach unexpectedly high levels.
At this point in time the attack rate of the current H1N1
pandemic is not known with any confidence, and the results of
serological studies which can shed light on this are awaited.
Nevertheless, based on sureveillance data, it appears that while the
outbreaks in various countries have been larger than those of
seasonal influenza, they have not been as large as would be
predicted based on the above estimates (5:8 times as large as
seasonal epidemics). If this indeed turns out to be the case, it
becomes an important question for epidemiologists to explain this
discrepancy. There are several possibilities which need to be
considered:
(1) It may be that the fraction of susceptibles is even lower that
the value S0~0:64 that we posited, which would result in
reduction of the value of Re. If this is the case, then the
biological mechanisms behind a considerable prior immunity
need to be investigated.
(2) It may be that, contrary to what was posited above, the
reproduction number R0 (hence also Re) for pandemic H1N1
is considerably lower than that for seasonal influenza, reflecting
a lower transmissibility. If this is true, it could be explained as
a result of the fact that the seasonal strains, having already co-
evolved with the human population’s immunity, have
developed higher transmissibility, in comparison with the
new swine flu virus which has not yet had this opportunity.
(3) While the above SIR modeling analysis provides an outline of
the processes at work, it obviously does not take into account a
number of subtleties and complexities characteristic to
influenza dynamics in heterogeneous populations. It could
be that some of these effects could lead to a reduction of the
the relative sizes of pandemic influenza as compared to
seasonal influenza, as predicted by the above analysis. If this is
indeed the case, it is important for future modeling studies to
identify what are these important factors that must to be taken
into account.
We believe that the considerations and calculations presented
here, and the questions raised, can serve as a starting point for
stimulating future debate around these important issues.
Supporting Information
Text S1 We derive characteristics of an epidemic described by
the SIR model in terms of the parameters of the model.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009565.s001 (0.09 MB
PDF)
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